UKRAINIAN DETERRENCE

Most of us think of deterrence as something almost completely at the strategic nuclear level. The fact is it works at many levels and doesn’t have to involve nuclear weapons at all.

The basic theory of deterrence is that you might think you can attack me, but I’ve got something that will break your neck if you do. Your opponent knows it, so he doesn’t attack you because he wants to stay alive. It’s this fundamental and simple if rather brutal concept, that has been the backbone of MAD – mutually assured destruction – the backbone of the nuclear deterrent theory. The cost of an attack outweighs the benefits so completely it becomes unthinkable.

Yet there are other levels of deterrence – and deterrence can also be an important factor even when a war is being fought. Ukraine has become a master of this principle without perhaps realizing it was becoming so.

When the war broke out with the Russian invasion, this was entirely down to the fact that Ukraine simply had no means or the resources, to deter Russia from its action. The western allies promised consequences if Russia did so, but it didn’t believe them, and their failure to be willing to deter Russia with serious sanctions and trade embargoes on oil and gas – because it would hurt their own economies, undermined any threats they might make. Putin relied on the fact that the oil and gas would enfeeble their responses, as it had always been intended to do.

NAVAL DETERRENCE

Yet the beginnings of Ukraine’s most outstanding deterrent capability – one that fundamentally has altered the war, began with the sinking of the Russian cruiser and flagship, Moskva. Little had taken the Russians by surprise as much as that attack. It simply wasn’t on their radar, Ukraine used a not entirely secret, but certainly far more capable pair of Neptune missiles than anyone realized they had.

The consequences of that were an effective deterrent was set up forcing the Russians to redeploy ships well outside of the range of Ukrainian coastal batteries. This was reinforced by a new generation of naval drones. Remember that at the time, Russia was using its naval might and potential clout to agree on and control grain export shipments through Istanbul. This was a means of control Ukraine was anxious to get out from under.

The naval drones quickly made themselves felt, reaching into the Sevastopol Naval base, to the Kerch bridge and the anchorage at Feodosiya. Before long Russian surface ships were sinking and they were quickly learning there was nowhere to hide except the far side of the Black Sea. And even that wasn’t immune. By deterring the use of what was left of the Russian surface fleet, the refusal of Russia to participate in the grain export deal became irrelevant. It had no means of enforcing its position, it was completely deterred from entering the western half of the Black Sea and remains so to this day. As a result the Ukrainians, along with their friends on the western Black Sea coast, have been running an incident free grain export corridor that has returned business to pre-war levels, reaching $24.8 billion in 2024. It’s a staggering turn of events and a major strategic defeat for Russia.

The Russians have tried to overcome the Ukrainians deterrent by using the oil and gas rigs as monitoring and jamming stations. However even that has been a failure, with Ukrainian special forces, using sea and air drones in combination to take out and take over the rigs. Russia doesn’t have the means to stop them. It has tried to use helicopters and fighters, but the later has limited operational success due to there lack of maneuverability against small seagoing targets. Helicopters had some success, until recently.

First the Ukrainians used drone mounted machine guns to fire back, but recently, yet again, they transformed the battle by successfully shooting down an Mi-8 helicopter with a missile. It was later reported that a second Mi-8 had also gone down, and a couple of days later an Mi-28 was also confirmed as lost in the same engagement. It was a stunning success, a naval warfare first. It has huge ramifications for the future of naval combat. But most of all, it absolutely reinforced Ukrainian control over the sea, and increased the deterrence factor – Russians would have to think twice now about engaging even with the only platform that had any success against the sea drones, the helicopter. Ukraine has through deterrence made the western Black Sea a no go area.

CRIMEA AND DETERRENCE

Throughout history, Crimea has been a key strategic asset for whoever owns it. It dominates both the Black Sea and the Ukrainian hinterlands to its north. It is the key to controlling the sea lanes. It should be key to air operations and land operations in Southern Ukraine. Its owner should be able to dominate everywhere within 1000km around it. Turkey is so aware of its importance (as much because it is a former owner), that president Erdogan has made it clear he regards the return of Crimea to Ukraine as essential, he doesn’t want to see Russia in permanent charge of such a strategic territory. Crimea is in peacetime, potentially the key to the region on land and sea.

At the start of the invasion it clearly played a vital role. Rail and road connections over the Kerch bridge essential in supplying the initial invasions into Kherson and Zaporhizia.

However once the tide turned in Kherson and the Russians retreated over the river, and as the overly publicized and failed offensive into Zaporhizia began, Crimea came under what would be endless and relentless attacks.

Nobody will forget the Storm Shadow ripping through the office window of the Black Sea Fleet commander. Nor will we forget the airfield destruction, the radars, the command posts, the arms depots, the docks, the landing ships transporting troops in flames. We certainly will not forget the explosion on the Kerch Bridge and the oil train blazing on fire.

This wasn’t just a one off. Ukraine kept up the pressure on Crimea and its bases, air defences and radars and still does, because it has in effect neutralized the peninsula. If it moves they attack it, and it’s reached a point where the Russians have almost given up using it. That is another example of effective deterrence. Its denied the Russians effective use of one of their most useful strategic assets in prosecuting the war. The Ukrainians also use their naval drone dominance to carry recon and FPV drones up to the coast and exert influence on land.

This actually delivers a situation where Crimea is better for Ukraine while the fighting continues. They destroy what they don’t like or threatens their interest. In the event of any kind of peace, the Russians could rebuild their positions in Ukraine – learn lessons from the conflict and be ready to deal with its defence the next time round. They almost certainly would never allow the dominance Ukraine has achieved in the western Black Sea to go unanswered. Russia remaining in control of Crimea post-conflict is a serious threat to the region and always will be.

GOVERNMENT CENTRE DETERRENCE

Many are shocked at the fact that Russia hasn’t yet destroyed the Ukrainian government centre, the Rada, or any of the major ministries in Kyiv.

Initially this would have been about using them once the invasion had been successful, but we’re obviously way beyond that now, although I suspect Putin still harbors notions of standing there victorious.

Relatively early in the long range drone campaign the Ukrainians managed to land a drone on the Kremlin dome, and another on the roof of the MoD. Another hit one of those office towers belonging to the economics ministry. They were all demonstrations of potential capability and I think they were significant enough to act as a deterrent. The symbolism of a major attack succeeding on the Kremlin or the MoD or any other state ministry was far too big to coverup if it happened and would be a monumental propaganda defeat for the regime. As a result, neither side has made any real effort to hit central government – it would be bad for both sides and the fact it hasn’t happened is a very visible sign of deterrence in action.

The Russians could drop a Kinzhal or an Oreshnik at anytime, but they know that Ukraine’s cruise-drone capabilities have only improved and grown more capable. If they did it, they know Moscow would be targeted. As it is the level of defence committed to Moscow is huge. Partly that’s Russia deterring a Ukrainian attack, but the threat of an attack is so concerning in Putin’s information warfare mind, that he’d rather strip the frontline of air defence than risk it.

THEORETICAL NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

There’s been a lot of low level talk that Ukraine should develop nuclear weapons. A recent survey found Ukrainians were more inclined to believe in the benefits of their own nuclear deterrent than NATO membership, something in the region of 70:30.

You could easily argue that an arsenal of even fifty weapons, from low tactical to city smashing 200Kt, would have made the Russians disinclined to take the risk of an invasion. Nuclear weapons do confer a level of risk and danger that makes you more than think twice.

Nuclear weapons are well within Ukraine’s capabilities. They have the reactors, they could produce sufficient plutonium, they have the unconventional means of delivery that would make it likely they could deliver the weapons. Anyone who knows their stuff will tell you building the bomb itself is easy, it’s getting the fissile material that’s the problem, and fashioning it to make a viable warhead pit. But none of this is beyond Ukraine’s capabilities.

If I was sat in the room being asked to decide if we should or should not go ahead with such a development, I’d have no hesitation in saying yes. With Russia as a neighbor I’d have no qualms at all. If it was one more thing that would make them think twice about ever invading again, how could you say no? Even more so if NATO is still denied as an option.

Russian feelings on the matter are irrelevant. They deserve no consideration. They have shown by their actions what they will do and they will never end up in some criminal war crimes court to be punished – as Zelensky himself pointed out just the other day.

CONCLUSION

Ukraine has and continues, to enforce a level of deterrence on Russian operations at sea, in Crimea and at a strategic level. The end of the conflict, or its indefinite suspension could reverse some of those gains. In that case Ukraine only has two ways of defending itself – NATO membership or nuclear weapons development. They are the only two absolutes that would, in my opinion, deter Russia sufficiently.

Most in the west would decry the later option even if they understood it. Neither America, Britain or France have the right to deny Ukraine the option they themselves use to deter Russia. Anyone in the West who argues against it is cynical and unrealistic. Either bring Ukraine into NATO or ignore its actions – no matter the consequences for nuclear proliferation – when it is forced to develop the only deterrent Russia seems to understand. We let Israel get away with it, France and the US secretly helped them. So why stop Ukraine? When you’re faced with an existential threat to your existence what else are you supposed to do?

The Analyst

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