RUSSIANS HIT BY UKRAINIANS AT POKROVSK

Over the past week the Ukrainians have managed three highly successful special forces operations in regaining key points on the outer Pokrovsk defence lines.

First of all all three of these positions were, having looked back on the record, lost with alarming ease. One particularly was an expensive series of heavy newly fortified trenches and bunkers that really should not have been surrendered with what appears to be some speed. The bunkers were undamaged, the trench works brand new and well made.

Part of the problem with the war in Ukraine is that almost nobody covers when things go badly for the defenders. Channels like RFU and others only ever report amazing feats of Ukrainian military operations without ever explaining how they got to be in this position in the first place, and it complicates both the historical record and understanding what goes wrong – and how to prevent it.

We know for example that the Ukrainians have adopted the NCO system following the NATO model for troops in the field, but many officers are known to have undermined the NCO system. The Russia-system trained officers expect soldiers not to anything without direct authorization, whereas the NCO would have used initiative and his legal and military authority to organize a better defence and perhaps, prevent a collapse in morale and troops fleeing others highly defensible positions.

This led to the Ukrainian command becoming concerned that Russian advances along the south and to the west of Pokrovsk had taken key points with relatively minimal effort when their own position was actually pretty dire. The Russians were largely exhausted, badly supplied and armed and since then had not been reinforced with even minimal supplies, including food and water.

On top of that they were under almost constant Ukrainian drone observation and attack, out of range of their supporting artillery and their own drones.

The Ukrainians sent in special forces to retake the mine at Kotlyne (although having wiped out the Russians there they were unable to remain in position when it came under heavy long range attack), They also retook Pischane and the neighboring fortifications. These operations have made it clear the Russian forces are in a bad way and far from capable of mounting offensive operations against a solid Ukrainian defence.

Perhaps the most concerning area of Russian advance if it resumes, is over the Oskil River in the north of the main front line. The Russians have managed to cross the river, which was seen as difficult, and then somehow managed to overcome the defenders on a highly defensible escarpment on the other side, and have reached open country. The only positive is there is not a lot except open fields in front of them, but long term it represents an extension to the front line and a risk to the Ukrainians on the Vovchansk front. It also weakens the Ukrainians position on the eat side of the Oskil river, where they are now only in command of Klieshievka and the area around it.

Fighting continues in Kursk, but with almost no change in positions.

Fighting around Krematorsk has been continuous with the Russians making small gains, assisted by heavy glide bombing of the town.

Overall the Ukrainians seem to be asking themselves why so much ground has fallen to such low level attacks by poorly equipped Russians, and are looking at rectifying it. On the one hand in terms of losses but also trying to define how to prevent their own side from being willing to evacuate defensible positions. Why is it happening? What can be done about it? Are the troops too inexperienced, badly led or poorly motivated? Do they lack supplies and ammunition? Either way something has to be done when expensive pieces of the defence line are too easily lost and each sector lost compromises the rest of the defence perimeter.

THE GLIDE BOMB PROBLEM

The glide bomb problem really needs some technological counter measure – the problem remains they are un-powered with no heat signature. While they can be seen on radar, radars are rarely used near the frontlines because they’re too easily attacked. The earliest troops get warning is a noise caused by the air flow which given their shape is quite distinct. However it gives barely five seconds warning, if that. On a clear day they can be seen as much as kilometer or so away (if you’re even looking for them) but even that is just a few seconds from impact.

The Ukrainians have been using a new weapon to hit glide bombs from around mid February, however they don’t want to talk about it and its believed several live tests have been successful and whatever it is, is due to be deployed more widely.

Meanwhile NATO has launched a glide bomb Innovation Challenge to find ways of knocking them down. Without an infra red signature they remain difficult to hit without using radar controlled point defence guns. They’re also quite heavily protected by their very nature, in thick steel casings. The US is also more than concerned by how such a countermeasure may work, as much of its air strike power is based on the use of heavy glide munitions like JDAMS.

Hopefully Ukraine has come up with a viable solution, it works and will assist in bringing down this very distinct Russian advantage.

The Analyst