THE END OF THE KURSK ADVENTURE

Many of you will have followed me on Telegram to here and Bluesky – for which I’m always grateful. You’ll remember the start of Kursk back in early August and how deeply opposed to it I was.

My reasons were simple. It had no objective, it was clearly a source of disagreement inside the Ukrainian top tier as to why they were doing it, the lack of unified messaging spoke volumes. Since then the Colonel in charge of planning has said there wasn’t an objective, and he was never clear as to why they were doing it. It was a reaction to a long and very painful Russian spring-summer campaign that never ended, along with the incursion into Vovchansk. Ukraine looked a little overwhelmed by the enemy advances, morale was low, ammunition wasn’t flowing from the US at speed despite the new aid package. The daily retreats seemed endless. Kursk was a reaction to all of that, a gamble, a point to be made, something to grab the headlines Ukraine had been lost from for weeks.

As I said back then, Kursk even as a morale booster – and it was, would be short lived – and that’s what happened.

My prediction was that Ukraine would take a good deal of empty land which would look impressive, and it did. Then they would run out of steam or overstretch, then faced with the fact they had secured entirely valueless territory, they would have to defend it because, as sure as day follows night, the Russians would mass their forces and take it it back, and they’d take their time doing it because everything they do takes time to organize. The system is too rigid to be any other way.

Oddly, the Ukrainians got very over confident. They made two major mistakes (other than doing it in the first place). They didn’t take the land to the west of the salient below the river south of Glushkovo – this should have been dead easy, but they satisfied themselves with blowing up the bridges over the river Snagost, without bothering to occupy the ground.

When the Ukrainians came up against the Russians at Kremenovo, they were clearly knocked off balance finding such strong Russian forces in a place they never suspected they’d find them. To be fair, in military terms, the Russians pulled off a remarkable effort getting such powerful forces in such numbers into the region – and the Ukrainians were largely oblivious to it. They were even more oblivious to the fact, despite blowing up multiple Russian bridging units they never found anyone crossing them – because it had all been done at night. The Russians had used the road from Kremenovo, bypassed the bridges and then mounted an attack eastward into the salient, which made rapid gains. The Ukrainians fell back quite quickly from Kremenovo and the Western side of the salient under pressure.

Having pulled off a remarkable counter attack – it was perhaps one of Russia’s best executed operations of the war so far, it all went wrong. The Ukrainians, who excel at defensive warfare and using terrain to their advantage, managed to cut the Russians to ribbons as they used the main roads to advance along, exhausting the attack and bringing it to an end.

I’ve said before you have to understand how the Russians use the ‘Box System’ for equipping an operation. You get given what commanders high up the chain think you’ll need to carry it out, they tell you what your objective is and then as local commander you get to decide how that’s going to be implemented in practice. However you have the resources you’re given and that’s that. Don’t expect anything else. So once the Russians had used up their armor and soldiers in direct road based attacks – and they repeated the same thing many times – they stopped, supply exhausted.

Other units did make efforts in the SE corner and the north but these always seemed half-hearted, more opportunistic and proof that something was being done, nobody was just ‘sat on their hands’.

The attacks, again from the East, that came next included the N.Koreans and it wasn’t easy for them. They were as good as canon fodder, they had no idea what they were doing and drones were totally new to them. The well prepared defences rendered them useless in short order. The Russians seemed to stand back and watch, bemused by how pathetically hopeless the NK troops were. It was shameful.

Yet even then you could sense that bit by bit the Russian infiltration tactics, slowly building up manpower in sheltered tree lines over days if necessary, regardless of cost the endless attacks, the manpower driven assaults, were slowly pushing the Ukrainians back. By the time they were faced with Malaya Locknya as the last line of defence in the center and north of a massively reduced salient, you could tell the Russians had the clear momentum. Its fall has triggered the almost certain collapse of the whole salient in the coming weeks. The Russians and N.K forces crossed the border in the SW corner into Ukraine in an effort to cut off the logistics. By this weekend the only road from the town of Sudja into Ukraine was under massive operational Russian fire control and an evacuation seems inevitable, and probably difficult. For now the Ukrainians hang on in there, but I’d be amazed if a withdrawal plan isn’t ready.

We’ve already seen the Russians towing away an intact Abrams tank, and there’s been an alleged increase in the number of Ukrainian soldiers captured. Talk of a ceasefire now in the Russians court (which I’d be surprised they accepted, especially with Ukrainian troops in Kursk still), seems to be pushing the Ukrainians to hold on to what’s left, in the ever constant hope this might be a bargaining chip.

There seems to be no doubt about two things as we enter the end game. The Ukrainians noticed a sudden massive uptick in the accuracy of Russian attacks on ammo supplies and their general positions – suggesting they had excellent intelligence on their situation. Some think the Americans gave it to them (even for this administration I’d be a little surprised if that were true) – it’s just as likely to be that the command team who operated in the Korenovo operation were just more thorough and they had far less of an area to look through than the start of the campaign. I think the Russians just prepared better than they usually do. They were given a new box of resources, the strategic need to eject Ukraine had reached a critical point – negotiations may be inevitable – and they just didn’t want Ukraine in Kursk with that card to play. So extra effort was made.

Even so there’s been plenty of information suggesting that US imagery companies have been supplying high-res information to third parties for months, who sell it on to the Russians. Missile strikes on internal Ukrainian targets have been unusually specific and well placed for the past weeks.

So it looks like the Kusrk Campaign is coming to an end, pretty much as I said it would. The worst part is the Russians may well follow the Ukrainians over the border opening another front, then quickly exploit it while the defenders are disorganized.

What I failed to predict was the level of Russian incompetence when things went wrong for them. Any military observer will tell you their initial counter attack at Korenovo and the West-East offensive was inspired strategically, it was the last place the Ukrainians expected it to come from. But when it went wrong as resources ran out, it failed to fully capitalize on its initial success so dramatically it became humiliating.

Yet, again as I predicted, sadly there was no way the Russians were going to let Kursk stand – one way or another they were going to get the Ukrainians out.

I take no pleasure in it, it’s a sad day, an end to a misguided operation that because of Russian incompetence, not Ukrainian strategic thinking, Russia humiliated itself and the North Koreans. It demonstrated extraordinary ineptitude, and worst of all gave the Ukrainians something that strategically they didn’t deserve for carrying out the operation in the first place; a reason for it that seemed to justify its existence. Russian failure despite huge numbers of men and machines, and Ukrainian defensive prowess, meant the Russians used up vast amounts of resources they shouldn’t have had to use – costing them elsewhere on the front. In doing say they gave the Ukrainian salient a temporary purpose, that may have changed some of the battlefield outcomes in the central front line. Russian ability to humiliate themselves even when they have good ideas, never ceases to astonish.

One day, I hope, we’ll be able to find out what the real story was on the Russian side, just as much as we will the Ukrainian, and finally piece together the whole of this fascinating military operation, the why’s and the wherefores. It has provided both sides with exceptional highs and lows. But in the end it’s gone exactly how I said it would from day one. And while that pleases me because I know my judgment and instincts are still working, and I can trust them, its painful to see Ukraine suffer this right when it needs it least, my heart hangs heavy with not being able to stop it. That though is the irony of history; it likes to kick you in the face right when you need it to be understanding; “If you hadn’t done it, this wouldn’t be the end result, would it?” That will be at least part of History’s judgment.

The aid for now is turned back on – but remember that there’s only $3.8 billion of it left. No more is planned. Kursk may be the one thing that the Russians won’t give up on, no matter the pressure from Washington. One way or another Kursk is coming to an end in the next few days and weeks. The question as to what happens next lies with any possible ceasefire – but I’d be amazed the Russians would go there when preaching so hard against it to their domestic audience. Phrases such as ‘the only ceasefire will be the one we decide to let you have’, seem to show they think they’re the ones in charge of how the war ends.

If the war continues, the question next is what has Ukraine opened up as Kursk collapses? Is the front line even more tiring and lengthy? Will Koreans begin full scale operations inside Ukraine? Will the Russians exploit it or redeploy where they may be needed most? Only time will tell.

The Analyst

militaryanalyst.bsky.social