RUSSO-UKRAINIAN NEGOTIATIONS

The very way in which Ukraine became independent is worth anyone’s reading time. It was semi-chaotic and took the Russians completely off guard – it really wasn’t what Moscow was expecting, and the arguments over who got control of the Black Sea Fleet came close to fighting breaking out.

Yet in the end the Ukrainians ended up with the third largest nuclear weapons arsenal – although they had no real means of operating most of it, they were able to stop the Russians from doing so.

This was a period where the US and Russia had agreed a massive reduction in nuclear weapons stockpiles – over the course of the decade to come almost 70,000 nuclear warheads of many types were dismantled. So much was reprocessed that in 2012 11% of all US electricity was generated from reprocessed Russian warheads in nuclear reactors.

Budapest Memorandum and 1997 Russian-Ukrainian Treaty of Friendship

The Budapest Memorandum is an agreement between Russia and Ukraine reached on December 5, 1994 and co-signed by the United States and United Kingdom.

The Memorandum was enacted after Ukraine agreed to surrender the nuclear weapons it inherited from the USSR to Russia. In exchange for this act, the Memorandum committed Russia, the US and UK to:

“…respect the Independence and Sovereignty and the existing borders” and “refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine.”

It’s not the only agreement intended to protect Ukraine. The 1997 joint Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership commits both parties to

“mutual respect and trust” and to “respect each other’s territorial integrity.”

Both pacts are intended to prevent conflict between the two nations. The Budapest Memorandum was taken entirely on trust, it had no legally enforceable clauses, it was not a formal treaty and the other parties offered no guarantees beyond playing lip service to the idea. The fact was that the western powers didn’t think it possible that either of them were capable of doing anything and were unlikely to do so. They both had too many internal problems to contemplate it. For just over a decade that remained the case.

Russia broke the terms of the Memorandum and the Treaty of Friendship, by invading and annexing Crimea in 2014 and continuing to invade and attack Ukrainian territory, Russia has repeatedly breached its obligations under both the Memorandum and the Treaty.

THE MINSK AGREEMENTS

Named for the Belarusian capital, these agreements were implemented on

MINSK-I September 5 2014

MINSK-II February 12 2015. This agreement was more substantial and contained twelve stipulations allowing for de-escalation of the conflict in the Donbas, which Russia was deliberately agitating even as the agreement was being signed.

MINSK-III is not an actual agreement, but rather a shorthand for the concept of another round of negotiations or a new peace deal, one that, as of now, has been widely dismissed by both Ukrainian officials and international observers as unworkable or undesirable, given the failures of the previous Minsk accords. Since the full scale invasion in 2022, any concept that a peace deal or ceasefire based on any of the Minsk concept agreements has been ruled out.

The basic MINSK-I/II agreements contained the following:

•   Immediate and comprehensive ceasefire
•   Withdrawal of heavy weaponry from the front lines
•   OSCE monitoring and verification
•   Decentralization and special status for certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk
•   Amnesty for participants in the conflict
•   Exchange of prisoners and hostages
•   Humanitarian aid delivery
•   Restoration of Ukrainian control over its border
•   Withdrawal of foreign forces and mercenaries
•   Local elections in the disputed regions under Ukrainian law

As history has proven, Russia paid virtually no heed to these agreements. Almost as soon as they were signed the Russians and their Luhansk/Donetsk puppets started fighting again and a dogged stalemate of artillery and trench warfare became the norm.

When Zelensky came to power in 2019 he was elected on a platform of ending the war in the Donbas completely and quickly. He was quite open to allowing the two oblasts full autonomy inside Ukraine, or independence if they wanted it after an internationally supervised referendum. Russia however was simply not interested. It had no intention allowing these two to escape from Russian orbit because they were a key part of its plan to re-integrate Ukraine as a whole, at the minimum reduce it to a puppet state supporting Russia.

Now here we are in 2025. The war – the largest and most deadly in Europe since 1945, has created a sense of Ukrainian nationhood and unity beyond anyone’s imagination. Even Russia speaking Ukrainians have no wish to part of Russia now. Their orthodox religions have separated completely and any demand that Russian orthodox churches be allowed to resume in Ukraine will be met with a negative response. Russia used the church to spread propaganda and recruit agents – which is hardly a surprise as the Patriarch, head of that church, Kyril was once an FSB officer.

What can Ukraine give and what will it get in return? Accepting the fact that the two Donbas Oblasts have gone for good is probably wise, if uncomfortable. Russia however put itself in a stupidly naive position by formally annexing the Kherson, Zaporhizia, Crimea, and Luhansk & Donetsk oblasts. Under Russian law and its constitution, nobody is legally able to give away or negotiate away Russian territory – even if it never occupied that territory in the first place. They annexed lands they had no control over and Ukraine is never going to give them what they haven’t taken. So either Putin falls back on his demands because he can’t change the constitution without there being a swell of dissatisfaction from inside Russia he doesn’t want to face. Or, he decides to amend the constitution to make a settlement possible. I don’t see him doing that, ever.

The best Russia is likely to offer is a mutual withdrawal from the current contact line and a demilitarized zone. Yet I don’t trust them to maintain that and they won’t want anyone monitoring them. ‘Trust but verify’ – I don’t see it. They want to break the deal eventually so any verification will be unwelcome.

You cannot believe, with Russia’s track record that it can be trusted. It’s either a full scale observed demobilization and neutral zone like the DMZ in Korea in my opinion, or the war goes on until Russia collapses. Even then you know they will just be getting ready for round two. Putin will have to die and Russia fundamentally change before anything else can even be considered.

If I was Ukraine I would accept nothing more but nothing less than a 5km wide each side of the contact line DMZ. The rest of their borders would need to be treated in a similar way. I would not allow a resumption of land trade or a ground border crossing. Contained and monitored air travel only. No gas or oil transit.

And Russia will never agree to any deal that sees sanctions not lifted and it getting its money back. That’s a much wider discussion. If it stood in the way of peace Europe would give in eventually – maybe after six months of the DMZ working. Trump, sadly would probably drop the lot without much persuasion. And that’s another problem.

I know it seems wrong to say it but Russia is getting desperate, militarily, economically, politically. Why would you not press that advantage while you have it? Ukraine can break Russia and get everything back – I do believe that – if it just holds out. Russia is done, that’s one reason Putin is after these talks now, because he knows time is running out and he’s starting to lose Trump, just to make things worse.

If we take Putin’s attempt to negotiate as a sign of weakness, and I think we should, because there is an element of that in it, I just don’t think he’s serious. He knows things are bad in Russia, he knows it’s going to get worse. But he’s more interested in his own survival than Russia’s. And if the war has to go on to keep the troops on the front lines and not demanding his resignation, when they come home to no jobs and no pay and a massive economic depression that will make the 1990’s look pale, that’s what he’ll do.

I have a deep underlying feeling this war is about a victory or a defeat. Putin sees this in WW2 terms. He either wins completely, so that there are no negotiations, or he loses, and he dies. He has no intention of letting that happen, so the war must go on, this is just another way of making sure it does. A game of negotiations to improve his political position with America. He knows the Europeans know what he’s up to, the audience is really Trump and those at home in Russia. The simple purpose to stop us from making a decision against him.

The frontlines still have endless fighting but no determined effort by Russia to break through. That is coming. They’re preparing themselves for a big spring/summer offensive. Possibly opening up a new area – Sumy has long been the favorite. Putin – and again I have said this before – has rolled the dice and chosen to do one last make or break it offensive – his own Operation Michael from 1918. In the end that was the last gamble for the Kaiser’s army. Whatever this is, it will be Putin’s.

I have said before there will be no diplomatic end to this war. I still believe that. For Putin, ultimately its win and secure his legacy, or die trying.

For Zelensky who has already made it clear he will present in person, Putin has to face the fact that he either goes and meets him or Zelensky will steal the media focus standing in Istanbul with no Russian leader wishing to face him to make peace. Lavarov hardly counts. Putin will hate that but I think he’s too cowardly to go.

The Analyst

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