UKRAINE & GRIPEN: SECURING THE FUTURE

Ukraine took a giant step towards its future air defence last week. It chose in what my mind is the perfect aircraft for its circumstances now and in the future. To understand why we have to look back to the Soviet era air force, then at Russia’s tactical Air Force now, and then look at why the Gripen is so right for the Ukrainian Air Force.

The Russian invasion in February 2022 was presaged with what most of us would have expected – a massive missile strike on every aspect of Ukraine’s early warning radars and air bases, and the fixed systems were indeed heavily damaged or destroyed. Yet the Ukrainian command had already decided, that even though the politicians didn’t see the risk quite as sharply as they did, the decision to disperse was already given. Perhaps in many ways that’s one of the advantages of having a military C-in-C and not the head of state. Yet that is also what the Soviet era doctrines would have recommended. Soviet Air Force doctrines were to carry out the mission of primary attack then disperse immediately – the assumption being return to base would be too risky and maybe not possible. Ukraine never forgot that doctrine, yet quite bizarrely, the Russians did.

We all assumed that the Russians knew how to conduct what we call SEAD missions – locate, track and destroy air defence sites – especially the mobile ones. Why would they not? How could they not? Yet it quickly became obvious the Russian tactical aviation after is initial sorties, was pretty much incapable of doing so and it retreated out of sight for almost a year. Only the lonely Su-25 Frogfoot tactical strike bomber used by both sides was ever much seen. They now seem to be a thing of the past for both sides, presumably all attrited after four years of fighting. Russia’s Air Force is now the delivery vehicle for thousands of ever increasing range glide bombs used against the front lines and cities, and the delivery of cruise missiles. Mostly out of the range of air defences or fighter interception. Air to air combat is unheard of.

Ukraine finally acquiring western fighters in the shape of F-16 and Mirage-2000’s has substantially reinvigorated its almost depleted Air Force, which despite many donated Mig-29 Fulcrum’s was struggling to deliver the weapons needed. That and the loss of so many Su-24 Fencers – the only one capable of carrying the much used StormShadow/Scalp EG missile had been the best Ukraine could do.

The Russians had failed themselves completely. Lack of training hours, almost non- existent organizational structures and a derisory command system all played their part, and the fact Western intelligence had never worked this out – leaving it to the dangerous world of assumption making, explains why so many were shocked at how bad they were. It was frankly, unbelievable. I personally was stunned at how inept Russia’s air forces were and still are, given four years of war.

Ukraine has had no choice but to rely on dispersed air operations. The F-16, notorious in the west as a ‘base bunny’ for its sensitive landing gear and need for clean and clear runways has had to adapt. Ukrainian pilots when they leave on a sortie, never go back to the place they took off from, ever. This requires a hugely competent command and control structure that knows when and where to be to recover returning aircraft and administer to the pilots and aircraft’s needs. Its a complex process which they manage with extraordinary operational discipline.

Gripen is the answer to a Ukrainian air commanders dreams. It is the only aircraft in western inventories designed specifically for dispersed operations – a requirement baked into Ukrainian doctrine. Any future ’round 2′ with Russia will require dispersal from minute 1 of any possible conflict.

Another issue is availability; how many of your aircraft are actually available at a moments notice to get airborne and able to do their jobs? Gripen has an 85% average. That’s way above Eurofighter and aircraft like F-16. It’s also far cheaper to operate, with a crew of just 11 people including a maintenance truck, fuel tanker and drivers, that carry everything from spares to fuel and weapons. A typical F-16 is twice that.

The cost per hour is also far cheaper at around $8,000 per flight hour – but it can be less, according to SAAB, depending on how the aircraft is deployed. Again, an F-16 is way over twice that, and needs 16-40 hours of maintenance per flight.

The cost of a Gripen E, the variant chosen, is estimated at $85m per unit, as a fly away cost without weapons and support. That’s against a cost of $70 million for a block 70/72 F-16 as supplied to Taiwan for example. However a fully specified and weaponized F-16 is in the $280m per unit range fully equipped and supported. Gripen is half that.

Gripen E is also designed with a digital air frame and equipped with the latest electronic warfare equipment – and its modular given it an upgrade capability as the environment changes. The F-16 just doesn’t have that kind of design, despite its many upgrades, a sign of its advancing years.

Gripen E uses advanced electronic warfare systems; an EW triple signal generator system that confuses enemy systems as to its location and even its existence. Without that they have no firing solution. The three generators deal with DRFM – Digital Radio Frequency Memory, Doppler and Noise. DRFM basically reflects back the radar frequency that hits the aircraft and makes it appear that nothing has been contacted by the scanning radar, ‘an empty return’ with nothing on screen. The Doppler creates false targets so that the aircraft or missile cannot gain a permanent lock. Noise blacks out whole frequency ranges, or specific frequencies being used against the aircraft.

There’s no doubt that that the new EW suites and the sophisticated AESA radar system are all well ahead of what Ukraine uses now. Pilots will need to adapt and train extensively to gain the best from the aircraft. I find it odd that in many western – (especially American) – analyses they seem to have a doubt that Ukrainian pilots can manage these transitions. I would suggest they look long and hard at what Ukrainian pilots have achieved, transitioning from Mig-29’s to F-16 and on top of that learning from scratch how to operate F-16 and Mirage – very different aircraft. If they have doubts about what Ukrainian pilots are capable of, I suggest they go and bring that up with them directly. It’s a sort of bizarre American snobbery that somehow they must be the best and nobody else could possibly be as good.

The fact is that Ukraine has been training pilots on the Gripen since 2023. This has always been the end result of a long process. With a cadre of train-the-trainer pilots who initialize a wider training group who train the day-to-day pilots, you always have a rolling resource of understanding and comprehension.

The Gripen was designed with one main foe in mind – Russia. It was designed to handle the Mig’s and the Sukhois, and Russian aviation industry is way behind everyone else right now. The Chinese have stolen that crown and the slow speed of Russian aircraft acquisition, let alone their abysmal training shortfalls, isn’t going to produce some extraordinary Air Force out of nowhere. The Gripen will be a match for anything they have – simulated combat from Thailand had it dealing with Chinese fighters at a rate of 9 to 1.

It’s not just about air defence either. Gripen E has the capacity to use the German Taurus as well as the Scalp/StormShadow. No other aircraft that small can cope with them. Given its capabilities and its weapons load out options, it’s a huge uplift in Ukraine’s future defence. It’s the right aircraft, and Sweden is frankly the right country to deal with. They were long neutral and know what dealing with Russia is like, they built their aircraft to deal with the very same threat Ukraine is going to have to live with for decades to come. I can’t think of a more honorable partnership.

The Analyst

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